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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

23 August 1978

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[REDACTED]

This is a complete transcript of the
New Haven Talk to Assoc. Univ. Profs.
The one that was so bad from our point-of-
view. Theirs seems to be complete.
Capt. T said to send it to you for your
files.

Cele

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American Association of University Professors - 10 June 1978

Second Speaker - Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence

Good morning, good afternoon. In thinking about being with you here today, I was struck by the commonality of our profession. The intelligence profession, the academic profession are both founded on good research and searching out information. They're both founded on analyzing that information, interpreting it, adding to the fund of knowledge available. They're both founded on publishing that data, making it available to those who need it so they can draw better conclusions in whatever line of work they are engaged. In our country there is a similarity because in the non-governmental sector there's a greater concentration of research skills as identified by a PhD in the academic community than anywhere else; in the governmental sector that concentration is in the intelligence community. We have more PhD's than anyone else in the government. This commonality means in my view that we have a good enough foundation for a more comfortable, a more mutually supportive relationship than has existed in recent years. I happen to believe that a more mutually supportive relationship between us is particularly important to the United States of America today. Why? Because good intelligence is more important today than at any time since World War II. Your contribution to it can be significant and entirely proper.

Why is it more important that we have good intelligence? Thirty years ago we had absolute military superiority. Today we are in the position of mere parity. Clearly, the leverage of knowing other people's capability and intentions in the military sphere is much greater when you are at a

position of mere parity. Thirty years ago we were totally independent economically. Today we are clearly interdependent with many other countries. It is much more important today that we know what is going on and what is going to happen in the economic sphere than it was thirty years ago. Thirty years ago we were a dominant political power and many smaller nations took their cue from us automatically. Today not only do those nations not take cues from anybody, but there are many many more of them. Pick up your morning papers and read about a country you never heard of a decade ago. It's everyday in that way. Why, though, must we obtain information about the military, political and economic activities through intelligence? For the simple reasons that we are blessed by living in the most open society the world has ever known. But most of the nations of the world do not enjoy that privilege. And yet the activities of those closed societies have tremendous import and impact on our military, political and economic well being.

For instance, would anyone in this room even think of concluding an agreement on strategic arms limitation with the Soviet Union if we could not assure you from the intelligence side that we could check and verify whether that agreement is being carried out. This isn't a question of whether you trust the Soviets; whether you have confidence that they will do what they say. The stakes are too high in this particular game for any country to put its total fate in the hands of someone else without any ability to check on them.

So, too, with the many other negotiations in which our government is engaged today in an attempt to reduce the threshold of the probability of

resort to arms. Mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe; anti-satellite negotiations; comprehensive test bans on nuclear weapons testing; reductions in conventional arms sales around the world - all of these are founded on good intelligence.

But much more than the military sphere is at stake. Our country stands for increased international economic growth, narrowing the gap between the under-privileged nations of the southern hemisphere and those of us to the North. And yet, here too, you need good economic information. You need not be surprised by a closed society like the Soviet Union that entered the grain market in 1973 in a way that disturbs all of our economies and yours and my pocketbook.

The CIA today publishes unclassified estimates. One last summer on the future of the Soviet economy, trying to inform everyone what to expect from that closed society, saying that they are going to have some problems in the decade ahead. Problems which will lead to pressures that will keep them from entering the international market as much as they are today we believe, and therefore impact on American business. We've had a study that was published on the international energy situation - that said that over the next decade the demand for oil out of the ground will be greater than the amount we can physically get out; not that it's not down there, but than we can get out. Therefore, there are bound to be increased pressures on prices and there will be restriction on economic growth. If we are going to combat, as we would like to in this country, a war on international terrorism, you simply have to penetrate and find out what is going on in international terrorist organizations. We do that from an intelligence

base. If we are going to conduct the war on international drug trafficking, you have to do much the same kinds of things.

And in the international political sphere, if you're an interventionist, an activist, you want the United States to get involved, or if you're a pacifist and you don't want the United States to get involved, you simply have to have good information as a foundation for your policy in one direction or the other.

Hence, this country must have today, some organization, call it the CIA or whatever you will, that can operate overseas, openly and clandestinely in order to gain the information that our policymakers need.

Today, however, the rules and the players have changed. Your intelligence community is under the tightest control and is operating more openly than ever before. We are, in my opinion, in an exciting period, an exciting experiment, in which we are evolving a new, uniquely American model of intelligence. What are these controls? What are these checks and balances that Bill referred to that we now have and did not have when the Church Committee report was written?

One, you have myself, the Director of Central Intelligence, with strengthened authority today. New authority to bring together all of the intelligence activities of our country, not just those of the CIA. And my personal conviction that the Intelligence Community will and must operate in conformance with the laws of this country and with its moral standards; and that it must cooperate fully with the oversight bodies that have been established.

What are those oversight bodies? What are those checks and balances built into the governmental structure? First is the President and the

Vice President who today take a very active and strong interest in our intelligence activities and supervise them closely.

Secondly, there is something known as the Intelligence Oversight Board; three distinguished citizens appointed by the President reporting only to him and to whom you or any of our employees can communicate directly. Call them up, write them and say you think Admiral Turner's off on a bad tack. They will investigate it; report only to the President.

Byond that there is a new role in the Justice Department; new regulations which they write and tell me how I may go about conducting my business.

And finally, there are two very rigorous oversight committees of the Congress; one in each chamber. And I can tell you having been on the hill for over twelve hours this last week that they hold me to the task. They interrogate me, we provide them detailed information and they know what is going on. In addition to this, I rely very much on the American public as a form of control on our intelligence activities. So today we are responding more to the media; we are coming more to academic conferences and symposiums, writing papers and supporting your activities. We are lecturing more; we are participating more in panels like this - and we are publishing more; we're publishing all that we can legally declassify and still find that we have a value to the American public. And any university or college that is not subscribing to the Library of Congress for \$255 a year to all the publications that we put out from the CIA, an average of two a week on an unclassified basis, is missing one of the greatest source bargains in the world. We have the Freedom of Information Act and a greater declassification program. These are not just a public

relations gimmick, these are founded in a sincere conviction that the better informed the American public is on issues of national interest, the stronger our democracy will be.

We want particularly, however, to share with the academic community. On the one hand because we need you. We need, as any research organization does, outside scrutiny to ask, are we seeing the woods for the trees? Are we making those same old assumptions year after year? Are we mired in our own thinking? Is our analysis rigorous? On the other hand, I think there is an untapped potential for the academic community from the world of intelligence. Our new sophisticated technical means of collecting intelligence has all kinds of potential for you as well as for us. I just learned the other day, for instance, that there's tremendous potential for archeology in our aerial photography capability; an ability to get to archeological ruins that are politically or geographically inaccessible and even to find more when you're there than you can get on the ground. We're anxious to share if we can in spheres like this. At the same time we're anxious to have you share with us your expertise, your knowledge, because we have a basic principle. We do not want to risk and spend money to go out overseas and clandestinely collect information when it is openly available inside our own society. So whatever connections with you, and not only with you but the entire American public, is an informal connection to try to ask questions and find out what people have learned if they have traveled abroad as they have studied or they've done research. And this includes informal consulting in areas of academic and scientific, technical expertise.

Beyond them we do have formal, contractual paid relationships with consultants, or for providing information. These are normally open unless the recipient, the person with whom we contract wants them to be kept confidential. We want the universities, in the cases of academics, to be informed. But clearly the relationship between the individual professor and the university is the relationship between them and not between us and the universities.

We agree that if a university like Bill's requires that all outside commitments of academic members be reported to the administration the CIA should be no exception. We disagree, however, that the CIA relationship should be singled out uniquely as it is in the Harvard guidelines which assumes that only a relationship with the CIA would endanger the professor's or the school's integrity. With all the opportunities today for conflict of interest we think that is a naive assumption.

Beyond the exchange of information in both directions, it should be obvious that we in the intelligence community are just as dependent as the American business community and the American academic community itself on recruiting good U.S. students, graduates of our universities and our colleges. We can't exist over time without an annual input of a relatively few of the high quality of American university graduates. We recruit today openly on about 150 different campuses just like businesses or other government agencies. I am sorry to have to tell you that there are a few campuses on which we are denied the right to have free communications and free associations.

In addition, the CIA needs to contract with some foreign students in our country, some very few of the 120,000 of these students. And despite malicious stories otherwise, let me assure you that all such contracts are without

coercion, are entirely free, and entirely a matter of choice with individual foreign students.

Let me sum up by saying that in intelligence in our country today we operate under two imperatives. The first is to recognize that the juxtaposition of open and closed societies in our world has dangers for the open society. Now there is not one of us here who would trade the short term advantages that accrue to a closed society for the blessings of openness and respect for the individual human being that we have in our society and we all have faith that that is a long term strength of great advantage. But at the same time we cannot be so naive as to think that we can forego collecting information about these closed societies without giving them undue and unnecessary advantage.

Our second imperative is to recognize that the basic purpose of intelligence in our country is to support and defend its free institutions. We attempt to do that by providing the most comprehensive, the most reliable data we can to the President, to the Congress, to some extent to the American public so that the best decisions for all of us can be made. In my view, it would make no sense whatsoever for us to jeopardize any of those free institutions in the process of collecting that information. I assure you that we are dedicated to conducting intelligence in the United States in ways that will only strengthen the basic institutions, the basic standards of our country. Thank you.

"The C.I.A. and the Academic Community"

One may take two perspectives on the Central Intelligence Agency: the first from the perspective of a citizen, the second from the perspective of a member of the academic community. The two perspectives converge, however, on a single important question: how to maintain conditions which support a free and open society?

We live in a culture used to verbal excess. The argument why the C.I.A. raises questions about the conditions of freedom in modern American society rests, however, on two assertions which may sound excessive, but which I mean seriously, however quietly I prefer to give voice to them.

First, the C.I.A. is a threat to the traditional meaning of the Constitution of the United States;

Second, the C.I.A. is a threat to the integrity of the academic community, and the integrity of the academic community is important to the social conditions of freedom in a democratic society.

1. The Founding Fathers had a deep skepticism about human nature and its weakness against the temptations of power. A proper constitution should, they thought, provide security against arbitrary power. To compress a long and complicated historical argument, one may say there have been from the beginning in American political thought two views how power may be made responsible.

The first view places emphasis on the form of government created by a constitution, on the institutional arrangement of the departments of government. Responsible government is to be achieved by setting up a government in which power is distributed carefully among the various parts in order to check undue power by any one particular branch in the whole, finely articulated, self-regulating system. In this view, checks against arbitrary or irresponsible power

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are institutionalized within the government which the constitution creates. A good constitution is judged by the form of government it creates. In the American experience, this is the view one normally associates with the term, "checks and balances."

The second view of the constitution puts emphasis not so much on the organization of the departments of government created by the constitution act of but on the/constituting government itself, the process by which governments are made or unmade, and insists that the true check on the power of government, on any one or all of the particular branches of government, lies always in the power of the people outside the doors of government. In this view, the measure of a good constitution is not the form of government which the constitution creates but the effectiveness of the process by which the people out of government are constantly able to discipline government by exercising the inalienable power which ultimately creates and sanctions all governments. In the American experience, it is the view one normally associates with the term, "constituent power."

The C.I.A. threatens to confound either view of the constitution as a check against irresponsible power. On the effectiveness of internal checks and balances (such devices as legislative oversight, the power of the purse, control by enabling legislation), the Senate Select Committee, chaired by Senator Church, concluded: "There has been, in short, a clear and sustained failure by those responsible to control the intelligence community and to ensure its accountability. There has been an equally clear and sustained failure by intelligence agencies to fully inform the proper authorities of their activities and to comply with directives from those authorities" (Final Report111, Book II, p. 15).

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On the effectiveness of the power of constituents outside of government, one may point only to the difficulty of receiving any information which may allow one to discover what one needs to know in order to make an informed judgment on any question. There is the Freedom of Information Act, to be sure, but the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is also mandated by the National Security Act not to disclose information which in the Director's judgment may imperil the confidentiality of sources or the security of the United States. The power of the people outside of government depends upon their capacity to know what goes on inside of government. That is not formally impossible, but it is practically improbable with the C.I.A.

2. The challenge the C.I.A. presents to traditional constitutional safeguards against arbitrary and unchecked power is, for the citizen, more important, more interesting, and more grave because it is a challenge to the general political order of modern American society. Yet, although on a less grand scale, the challenge of the C.I.A. to the integrity of the academic community is also a threat to the general political order because it is a threat to the social conditions of freedom in a democratic society.

Again, the argument, because it is interesting, is long and complex. One must indicate it in summary fashion. It is, essentially, the liberal argument against the power of the state, an argument for the necessity of pluralism to check inordinate power, whether political or social, wherever it appears. Madison and Tocqueville are its chief spokesmen.

The danger, especially in modern, complex, mass societies, is the dichotomy between the state and the single individual citizen. Despite political privilege and legal rights, the lone individual is hardly an equal in any contest

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with the state. The pluralistic argument for the social fabric of a free political order assumes the necessity of autonomous institutions, free from control by the state, which provide buffers between the state and the citizen. One thinks of business, the church, the press, unions, foundations, and the university.

Recent history has seen the erosion of the capacity of the ordinary citizen to believe in the integrity and the autonomy of such institutions. We have witnessed the loss of trust in the institutions of American society. The government, not wholly, to be sure, but in considerable measure, bears a considerable share of blame for weakening the conditions of trust which sustain the confidence of individual citizens. When foundations and universities, newspapers and publishers, unions and church organizations begin to be seen as covert extensions of the power of the state, an uneasy skepticism begins to pervade the mass of citizens. Nothing seems impossible; paranoia becomes plausible.

In the name of freedom and security, we have allowed an erosion of the meaning of the Republic and an erosion of the political and social safeguards which protect freedom within it. As one institution, although only one, the academic community has a responsibility, quite beyond its own special values and concerns, to demonstrate to the ordinary citizen that, yes, it is what it seems to be, that it is not an agency of the state, that it is an independent center of thought and teaching and research.

The C.I.A. and the Academic Community

The Report of the "Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities" of the United States Senate, the "Church Committee" of 1976, sets forth in detail the history of the involvement

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of the C.I.A. with academic institutions and individual academics. The conclusion of its hearings was that "there is a problem." The Church Committee believed, however, in the necessary needs of the nation for intelligence and for the "best advice and judgment our universities can produce," and that legislation on the use of individuals in the academic world was both unenforceable and a further intrusion of the state into the affairs of the academy, so it made no recommendations for legislation. Instead, the Committee concluded, it "believes that it is the responsibility of private institutions and particularly the American academic community to set up the professional and ethical standards of its members."

One can only welcome the reticence of the Church Committee in not recommending the intrusion of government into the internal affairs of colleges and universities, especially when a major concern generated by its report is the autonomy of academic institutions. Yet, the Church Committee report, itself censored by the very agencies it was investigating, puts a heavy burden on academic institutions because its Report deals with generalities at some distance from the "problem" it concludes is a real problem. It may be difficult to set one's own house in order when one does not know what disorder prevails, still the academic community has the obligation to think through and to be self-conscious of what its own professional and ethical standards are in relation to involvement with the C.I.A. or other agencies of the government and, even, with other institutions, public or private, which seek its services.

There is an obvious danger in doing so, of course, the danger of arousing apprehensions that there is or has been in a particular college or university some unacceptable relationship with the C.I.A. As the President of one college, I can say I have no knowledge of any relationship, paid or unpaid, by any member

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of the faculty, student body, or staff of Amherst College with the C.I.A. As President of the College, under the Freedom of Information Act, I did seek to discover whether any relationship did exist. The Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. Bush and later Admiral Turner, responded courteously and reflectively, but declined to answer the question.

There is the further danger of implying that any relationship with the C.I.A. is unacceptable. Surely, that cannot be so. It is of national importance that the government of the United States has the best intelligence possible on foreign affairs. It is obvious that the professional knowledge and scholarly competence of many faculty in American colleges and universities are an immensely valuable resource to an effective system of intelligence. The only caveat, the whole point of formulating standards for appropriate involvement in the gathering of intelligence, is that the relationship between an institution or an individual with the C.I.A., or any other agency or external body, not contradict general standards of professional conduct.

Premise: All members of the academic community have the responsibility
to avoid actions which call into question the integrity of colleges
and universities as independent and autonomous centers of teaching
and research.

The premise, one will quickly recognize is general, and not addressed only and particularly to involvement with the C.I.A., although the injunction of the Church Committee provides the occasion to reflect on criteria for the self-government of academic institutions. To put it another way, whatever standards or guidelines are established should be generalizable. If disclosure is appropriate for a relation with a governmental agency, so it is for a relation with other external bodies. For example, a professor teaching labor law who receives

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a fee as consultant with a labor union or corporate employer should let the students he teaches or the colleagues he addresses through word or publication know, so his objectivity may be considered and fairly assessed by those to whom he speaks.

To suggest there is an individual responsibility to the corporate good of the academic community raises a classic problem.

I will put aside the practical problem that if an individual chooses to engage secretly in an action which is contrary to the general norms of the community, there is -- by definition -- no way to know or to take that fact into account. It may be impossible to know whether a member of the academic community is acting in violation of the presumed norms of conduct for one who is a member of the academic community.

At the college of which I am president, there exists a code of intellectual responsibility. It asserts, "Amherst cannot educate those who are unwilling to submit their own work and ideas to critical assessment." That is a statement about intellectual responsibility on the part of students. It is also true for anyone connected with the College who cares about its essential educational purpose. That sentence is an attempt to capture in words the ideal of an intellectual community, namely, the belief that openness, honesty, the willingness to say what one has to say publicly, to accept criticism and to attend to opposing views, that all these qualities are essential, the necessary conditions of intellectual and educational life.

Secrecy subverts these essential values and conditions. Secrecy is, to put it shortly, intolerable in an academic community. The C.I.A., of course, insists that although it will not disclose any relation it has with a particular academic that any individual who does have a relationship with it is surely free to say so publicly.

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In effect, there is no bar to individual disclosure. The AAUP, in a resolution passed at its Annual Meeting, June 1976, in response to the Report of the Church Committee, called "on all academics to participate only in those governmental activities whose sponsorship is fully disclosed." If the government refuses itself to disclose its sponsorship, then the responsibility devolves on the individual to disclose the nature of the relationship to students, professional colleagues, and others who may be affected by it.

To say so is to tread on delicate ground, namely, the freedom of the individual to do what he or she chooses with one's own time and energy, whatever the attitudes of others. Practically, as has already been suggested, there is no way to enforce the claim for openness on the individual who rejects the claim. The ground is more delicate than that, however. The difference may be principled, not just practical. The danger in laying down general or institutional rules for individual conduct is that the individual may, on principle, reject the premises on which the generality builds. Further, given widespread suspicion toward any involvement with the C.I.A. because of its past practices, there may be an understandable anxiety about public awareness of any association with the Agency.

Having said all that, having taken into account the practical, principled, and psychological objections, one may still insist that the nature of the intellectual enterprise requires as much candor as one is humanly capable of achieving. How each single college or university will arrange its affairs to insure the probability that individuals will live up to their professional responsibility is, as I have said, a delicate problem in governance. Local traditions and local mores will determine how that may best be done. But I do think that it is dangerous to imagine that each individual is the only judge because that is to take the very ground on which the C.I.A. defends itself, namely, that anyone connected with it is free to say so. There is a corporate responsibility which transcends the individual faculty. It is not the faculty's responsibility to tell faculty

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what their professional or corporate responsibility is. It is up to the faculty of each institution to determine that, not just their professional responsibility to this or that particular institution, but their responsibility to the profession.

On the institutional side, namely, the responsibility of people like myself who are administrators, the problem seems to me much easier. I do not think that any administration of any college or university should:

1. Accept or administer grants or contracts whose sponsorship is not openly disclosed;
2. Allow sponsored research if the faculty member is not free to publish the results of that research openly;
3. Cooperate with any security clearance or inquiry into the background of any member of the faculty, staff, or student body without the obligation to inform the individual of such action;
4. Allow the recruitment of faculty, students, and staff for any employment by any agency unless the recruitment is public and open.

Finally, one comment to put things in a larger perspective. Situations may arise in which one chooses consciously to violate the standards of professional conduct because of the claim of a greater good. A respected colleague once put the dilemma by way of an anecdote. We know that the war against Nazi Germany was greatly helped by acquiring, in Poland, the cipher machine which was used to code German war orders. If conditions were such that an American professor, ostensibly acting as an independent scholar but in fact a secret agent, were necessary for the securing of the cipher machine, would it be permissible for the professor to do so?

The hard answer has to be that as an academic (as our philosophic friends like to say, qua academic) the action is impermissible because it violates professional standards of openness and honesty. The professor, conscious of the claim

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of the ethical standards of his or her professional calling, might well choose to put them aside. One good may have to give way to another.

But the principle of professional responsibility and the openness and honesty it dictates must be asserted and defended, and explicated in some of its particulars, before one may make an adequate judgment when, consciously, to violate it. The public one means finally to serve must be confident that only grave and pressing danger could possibly lead to the surrender of professional obligation. It is the responsibility of all members of American colleges and universities to conduct their professional life to deserve public confidence and to take no action which will call into question the integrity and the autonomy of American academic institutions.

Admiral Turner:

In thinking about being here with you today, I was struck by the commonality of our professions: the intelligence profession and the academic profession are both founded on good research, digging out information; they are both founded on analyzing that information and interpreting it, adding to the fund of knowledge available; they are both founded on publishing that data, making it available to those who need it so they can draw better conclusions in whatever line of work they are engaged. And in our country there is a similarity because in the nongovernmental sector there is a greater concentration of research skills as identified by Ph.Ds in the academic community than anywhere else; in the governmental sector that concentration is in the intelligence community--we have more Ph.Ds. than anyone else in the government. This commonality means, in my view, that we have between us a foundation for a more comfortable, a more mutually supportive relationship than has existed in recent years.

I happen to believe that a more mutually supportive relationship between us is particularly important to the United States of America today. Why? Because good intelligence is more important today than any time since World War II, and your contribution to it can be significant and entirely proper. Why is it more important that we have good intelligence?

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economically. Today we are clearly inter-dependent with many other countries. It is much more important today that we know what is going on and what is going to happen in the economic sphere than it was thirty years ago. Thirty years ago we were a dominant political power and many smaller nations took their cue from us automatically; today not only do those nations not take cues from anybody, but there are many many more of them--pick up you morning's paper and read about a country you never heard of a decade ago, it's every day in that way.

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But much more than the military sphere is at stake. Our country stands for increased international and economic growth, narrowing the gap between the underprivileged nations in the Southern hemisphere and those of us in the North, and yet here too you need good economic information. You need not to be surprised by a closed society like the Soviet Union that entered the grain market in 1973 in a way that disturbed all of our economies and you and my pocketbooks. The CIA today publishes unclassified estimates, one last summer on the future of the Soviet economy, trying to inform everyone what to expect from that closed society, saying that they are going to have some problems in the decade ahead, problems which will lead to pressures that will keep them from entering the international market as much as they are today, we believe, ^{in fact, on} And therefore, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ American business. We've had a study that was published on the international energy situation, which says that over the next decade the demand for oil out of the ground will be greater than the amount we can physically get out; not that it's not down there, but that we can get out. And therefore there will not only be increased pressures on prices, but there will be restriction on economic growth.

If we're going to combat, as we would like to, in this country a war on international terrorism, you simply have to penetrate and find out what's going on in international terrorist organizations, and we do that from an intelligence

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Today, however, the rules and the players have changed. Your intelligence community is under the tightest controls and is operating more openly than ever before. We are, in my opinion, in an exciting period, an exciting experiment in which we are evolving a new, uniquely American model of intelligence. What are these controls? What are these checks and balances that Bill referred to that we now have and did not have when the Church Committee reported? For one, you have myself, Director of Central Intelligence, with strengthened authorities today, new authorities to bring together all of the intelligence activities of our country, not just those of the CIA. And my personal conviction that the intelligence community will and must operate in conformity with the laws of this country and with its moral standards, and that it must cooperate fully with the oversight bodies that have been established. What are those oversight bodies? What are those checks and balances built into the governmental structure? First, there are the President and the Vice-

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there is something known as the Intelligence Oversight Board-- three distinguished citizens are appointed by the President, reporting only to him, and to whom you or any of my employees can communicate directly, call them up, write them, and say "That feller Turner's off on a bad tack," they will investigate it and report only to the President. Beyond that there is a new role for the Justice Department, new regulations which they write and tell me how I may go about much of my business. Finally, there are two very rigorous oversight committees of the Congress: one in each chamber. And I can tell you, having been on the Hill for over twelve hours this last week, that they hold me to the task, they interrogate me, we provide them detailed information and they know what is going on. In addition to this, I look very much on the American public as a form of control on our intelligence activities. So today we are responding more to the media, we are coming more to academic conferences and symposia, writing papers and supporting your activities, we are lecturing more, we are participating more in panels like this, and we're publishing more, we are publishing ~~more~~ all that we can reasonably declassify and still find that it has a value to the American public. Any any university or college that is not subscribing to the Library of Congress for \$255 a year to all the publications we've put out from the CIA--an average of two a week-- on an unclassified basis, is missing one of the greatest source bargains in the world.

We have the Freedom of Information Act, and a vigorous public-relations gimmick; these are founded on a sincere conviction

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that the better informed the American public is on issues of national importance, the stronger our democracy will be. We want particularly, however, to share with the academic community on the one hand because we need you, we need, as any research organization does, outside scrutiny to ask "Are we seeing the woods for the trees?" Are we making those same old assumptions year after year, are we mired in our own thinking, is our analysis rigorous? On the other hand, I think there's an untapped potential for the academic community from the world of intelligence. Our new sophisticated, technical means of collecting intelligence have all kinds of potential for you as well as for us. I just learned the other day, for instance, that there is tremendous potential for archaeologists in our area of photography capability, an ability to get to archaeological ruins that are politically or geographically inaccessible, and even to find more when you're there than you can if you get on the ground. We are anxious to share what we can in spheres like this. At the same time we are anxious to have you share with us your expertise, your knowledge, because we have a basic principle: we do not want to risk and spend money, to go out overseas and clandestinely collect information when it is openly available inside our own society. So, one of the connections with you, but not only with you but with the entire American public, is an informal connection to try to ask questions and find out what people have learned as they have traveled abroad, as they have studied, as they have done research. This includes informal consulting in

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areas of academic, and scientific, technical expertise. And

I would note that the Church Committee

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in such relationships as these, no danger to the integrity of the American private institution. And, in fact, the report stressed the benefits both to the government and the universities of these contacts.

Beyond them, we do have formal, contractual, paid relationships ~~wt~~ for consulting or for providing information. These are normally open, unless the recipient--the person with whom we contract--wants them to be kept confidential. We want the universities in cases of academics to be informed. But clearly the relationship between the individual professor and the university is a relationship between them and not between us and the university. We agree that if a university, like Bill's, requires that all outside commitment of academic members be reported to the administration, the CIA should be no exception. We disagree, however, that the CIA relationship should be singled out uniquely as it is in the Harvard guidelines, which assume that only a relationship with the CIA would endanger the professor's or the school's integrity. And with all the opportunities today for conflict of interest, we think that is a naive assumption.

Beyond exchange of information in both directions, it should be very obvious that we in the intelligence community are just as dependent as the American business community and the American academic community itself on recruiting good U.S. students, graduates of our universities and our colleges. We can't subsist over time without an annual input of a relatively few but a high quality of American university graduates. We recruit today openly on about

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150 different campuses just like businesses or other governm

agencies. I am sorry to have to tell you that there are a few campuses on which we are denied the right to have free communication and free association. In addition, the CIA needs to contract with some foreign students in our country, some very few of the 120,000 of these students, and despite malicious stories otherwise, let me assure you that all such contracts are without coercion, are entirely free, are entirely a matter of choice to the individual foreign student.

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Let me sum up by saying that intelligence in our country today we operate under two imperatives:

The first to recognize that the juxtaposition of open and closed societies in our world has dangers for the open societies. Now there is not one of us here who would trade the ~~this~~ short-term advantages that accrue to a closed society for the blessings of openness and respect for the individual human being that we have in our society, and we all have faith that that is a long-term strength of great advantage. But at the same time we cannot be so naive as to think that we can forego collecting information about these closed societies without giving them undue and unnecessary advantage.

Our second imperative is to recognize that the basic purpose of intelligence in our country is to support and to defend its free institutions. We attempt to do that by providing the most comprehensive, the most reliable data we can to the President, to the Congress, and to some extent to the American public so that the best decisions for all of us can be made. In my view it would make no sense whatsoever

any of these free institutions in the process of collecting that information. I assure you that

Approved For Release 2001/11/22 : CIA-RDP80B01554R002800260001-7 the United States in ways that will only strengthen the basic institutions the basic standards of our country. Thank you.

MASON: Thank you, Admiral Turner for commenting so frankly on the new CIA's attitude toward the many problems in relationships with academe.

Our final speaker, Professor Morton Halperin, received his Ph.D. here at Yale in 1961. After 6 years on the Harvard faculty he served more than three years in the Federal Government including a position as Senior Staff Member of the National Security Council in 1969. He was with the Brookings Institution from 1969-73, and since 1973 has been Director of the Center for National Security Studies in Washington. He is a widely known and widely respected spokesman on functions of the intelligence agency.

MORTON HALPERIN:

Full disclosure compels me to say that I was also on the panel in 1976, and I appreciate this second opportunity to speak to you. Although I must say after hearing these two rather clear and somewhat classical statements of the two positions, I feel a little bit like the donkey in the famous story of the man who was visiting in Eastern Europe and had to get to a small village over the mountains. Not knowing how to go, he hired a guide, who arrived early in the morning with a wagon pulled by a donkey. And they set off toward the village over the mountains. When they got to the first mountain, the donkey refused to go up; the guide got

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Third Speaker - Morton Halperin

I appreciate this second opportunity to speak to you although I must say that hearing these two rather clear and somewhat classical statements of the two positions, I feel a little bit like the donkey in the famous story of the man who was visiting in Eastern Europe and had to get to a small village over the mountains. Not knowing how to go he hired a guide who arrived early in the morning in a wagon pulled by a donkey. They set off to a village over the mountains and they got to the first mountain and the donkey refused to go up. So the guide got out and he pulled the donkey up the mountain. They got to the second mountain and the same thing happened. At the third mountain as they got out the man said to his guide, I'm here because I have to get to the next village, you are here because you're guiding me, but tell me why did you bring the donkey? I want to say that I agree very much with what Admiral Turner said about the importance in research of an independent intelligence agency which provides that research to the Executive Branch, to the Congress and to the public. And I agree also on the importance of cooperation between the academic community and the CIA in the conduct of that research. But that seems to me to make it even more imperative that we "anti" the improper activities of the CIA because I think those improper activities interfere with the kind of relationship which

Admiral Turner talked about this morning and which I think is in fact desirable.

Now I'd like to focus my comments on one issue: Namely, the issue of the role of academics, the American communities, and American universities in secret recruitment of Americans and foreigners for the CIA. As Admiral Turner well knows, that was the main problem which the Church Committee had in mind when it talked about its concern about curbing CIA activities on campus. He well knows that that is in fact the issue of great controversy between critics of the CIA's role on university campuses in the activities of the CIA. And I regret very much that in his statement he has continued the CIA policy of refusing to talk about that role. The role which is explained in the Church Committee report, and a role which is of course, familiar to every foreign intelligence service which is interested in activities in the United States. It is a role, in short, of the CIA which is not familiar to the American public; and I think the CIA has an obligation to discuss that role and to try to justify it rather than to refuse to debate or to discuss it publicly. I think of one speech which briefly ended by putting some questions to Admiral Turner in the hopes it will encourage him to end this silence about these activities to begin to discuss them with us.

The Church Committee, in its report, said it was disturbed by the current practice of operationally using academics and that the restraints on the activities of the CIA on university campuses were to put it "primarily those of sensitivity to the risks of disclosure and not, the Church Committee says, an

appreciation of the dangers to the integrity of individuals in institutions, "by those current activities." And the Committee went on to say that it believes it is the responsibility of the university--the universities themselves--to correct this problem. It went on to say, somewhat ironically, that this report on the nature and extent of covert individual relations with the CIA is intended to alert these institutions that there is a problem. Now unfortunately, that was written at the time that the report contained a description, an accurate description, of what the CIA was now doing on the university campuses. But the Church Committee then submitted the report to the CIA. And the CIA, as the Committee told us, insisted that the report be substantially abridged and that the description of the CIA's role in secret recruitment on university campuses be cut down. It was cut down to the point that three members of that committee felt obliged in the concurring remarks to comment on that issue. One of those gentlemen has gone on to be the Vice President of the United States. And what he said to two of his colleagues was that the discovering of the role of the U.S. academics in the CIA clandestine activities has been so diluted in the Church Report that its scope and impact on American academic institutions is no longer clear. So we have to consider what the Church Committee said on the one hand was a great danger and on the other hand that the universities themselves should do something about it. But then they produce a report which Senator Mondale tells us is so

diluted that academics cannot know what in fact, is going on on the campuses that the Church Committee said that they should be concerned about.

The Harvard Report in fact, discusses that problem. And yet in commenting here and elsewhere on the Harvard Report, Admiral Turner to my knowledge has never said anything about these two paragraphs. And I think we'll want to read them in the hopes that that will stimulate some discussion. Talking about CIA recruitment on campus, the Harvard Report says this: the method involves the use of individuals--who may be professors, administrators, or possibly students--and who have an ongoing confidential relationship with the CIA and recruiters. The job of these covert recruiters is to identify to the CIA members of the community, including foreign students, who may be likely candidates for employment or other relationships with the CIA on a regular or sporadic basis. They go on to say that they understand when a recruiter identifies a person he gives the name to the CIA and that the CIA then conducts a background investigation on the individual. But then neither the recruiter nor the CIA informs the individual at this stage that he or she is being considered for employment or other purposes. The Harvard Report goes on to say that it feels for a number of reasons, that I think would be obvious to this audience, such relationships are improper and should not continue. The Harvard Report then recommends that any person who is in this kind of relationship with the CIA identify him or herself publicly as a recruiter

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for the CIA. It goes on to say that no member of the Harvard community should give the name of an individual to the CIA without that individual's permission.

Now, you have been told that this legislation has been introduced in the Senate Intelligence Committee. That legislation authorizes the CIA to continue to operate secret recruiters on universities campuses. It authorizes the CIA to conduct secret background investigations of Americans and foreigners within the United States. Therefore, it seems to me that the academic community has an obligation to take a position, as the Harvard community has done, on whether it thinks this kind of secret recruitment is proper. And if it does not think so, it has an obligation to go before the Senate Intelligence Committee which will be holding hearings on this issue and to say what rules and regulations and what guidelines you'll permit. Now let me conclude simply by putting a few questions to Admiral Turner. First, I'd like to ask whether it's allowed, as the Church Committee reports says, primary recruitment and CIA activities on the university campuses--is the risk of disclosure an embarrassment, rather than a threat to academic freedom? Second, I would like to ask him whether the activities which were described in the Church Committee report which have been quoted to you about activities on a hundred campuses as has been delicately put, maybe introductions have provided leads. Whether that is in fact, still going on on something like a hundred university campuses? Third, I would like to ask him

whether he has considered making public, in view of this administration's commitment to greater openness, making public now those secret portions of the Church report so that, as Senator Mondale told us, we would be able to have publicly an accurate picture of what is now going on on campuses. Mr. Mondale, when he was a senator thought that that could and should be made public. I don't know whether Admiral Turner and others of the Administration have considered whether that can now be done. Fourth, I would like to ask him whether the Harvard Report's description is essentially correct, and insofar as it is or is not correct why it is that the CIA cannot discuss publicly, why it is that he does not discuss publicly, whether that kind of activity goes on without naming names or naming campuses; but just discussing in general terms whether that activity occurs. Finally, I would like to ask whether the CIA is observing the Harvard guidelines that are in effect, those guidelines of Syracuse and other universities; and I would like to ask whether if other universities adopt these rules, the CIA will observe them. And specifically I would like to ask whether the CIA has told its secret recruiters the same thing that it has told the people that it has research relationships with. Namely, that the CIA will reexamine the secrecy obligations that they have taken and permit those people to state publicly that they have been and are now recruiters for the CIA. I think the question of secret recruitment does, as the Church Committee implies, pose very serious problems for academic freedom: And I think the time is long past for the CIA to simply refuse to discuss a subject

which puts important cases for academic freedom in the United States.

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In response to Bill Ward's very thoughtful comments on the threat of the CIA to our society: He said first it was a threat because there were not adequate organizational checks and balances. I hope I answered that in my comments. Let me point out that the Church Committee report is outdated by a great deal of the actions that we have taken to carry out these recommendations. Secondly, he was concerned that there can't be constituent power brought to bear as a check on the CIA because we can't tell the public everything about what we do. I agree with him that that is in fact the case. But at the same time, I am listening for a prescription of how to cure that. Our prescription is what I call surrogate public constituent oversight. That surrogate process are these committees of the Congress and the Intelligence Oversight Board that I referred to. As Bill has said, he supports the need for good intelligence in our country. But there is a conflict between having good intelligence and having 100% openness. And it is not the Intelligence Community alone that has secrets in our country. It is the academic community. CAP researchers certainly don't share their research before they publish it. It is the business community, who don't share information on their accounts and their plans and their programs. It is academics who consult with the business community and don't reveal the strategy for the firms that they are advising. All

of us have this problem of where we draw the line between complete public inspection of our activities and some degree of secrecy. We have been drawing it further and further in this country and, under this new model of intelligence, forced public disclosure. We are trying our best, but there are great risks and there have been disclosures that have not been intended that have seriously jeopardized our ability to continue an intelligence function and institution.

Morton asked some questions here that are complex. I'm not sure I've got them all written down or I can decide how to answer them. I think he makes an inference that I want to establish principles. The CIA does not operate collecting intelligence in the United States of America. Our job is to collect foreign intelligence overseas. We don't clandestinely work against the American citizen, or against the foreign citizen in this country. We come to them openly to ask them for information. We're not allowed by law to so call "spy" on the American citizen, or on the foreign citizen in this country. He pointed out that he thinks it's wrong that there be recruiting in which the individual is not informed that he is being considered for a position in the CIA. Everyone of you, every year I suspect, get a number of letters asking who's a good graduate student to go work here, or who would be good professors for the head of a department in another university, or that IBM would like to employ this person or that--could you recommend somebody. And I am sure that if you sum up their

qualities, their strengths, you rush right out and give that to the individual who is concerned. We recruit on campuses, we recruit just like everybody else does. Some of it's open, some of it's not. The not portions--Morton didn't hear me talk about them in my speech; and which he complained vigorously that I did not address or the CIA will not address. For the first time in public I addressed this issue today of recruiting foreign students on campuses and I told you we do very few out of some 120,000 who are here. And there is utterly no coercion in it. And it's no more secretive than much of the other recruiting that is done.

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Q: If we agree that the best intelligence, the best analysis, is necessary for comment on foreign affairs or the whole variety of things which you named; Would it not be possible to split the operational side of the agency completely from the policy and analysis side so that the policy and analysis side would not only be publicly available but I think would even serve the interest of the agency. Secondly, I think that they would have the confidence that they would have a policy analysis for getting a particular spy to contract who is exposed to the scrutiny of other professionals in the field. I think that split between the operational and the policy and analysis side would not only allow academics to participate comfortably, it would also serve the interest of the agency.

A: I think what you're really saying, Bill, is that academics simply have a built in bias--that if they associate with the CIA they're tarnished. Even Norman Bimbaum is associating with us these days. Seriously, the connection between the analysts and the people who collect intelligence--whether they collect it from our technical system, whether they collect it from our human intelligence system, whether they collect it from our overt, open system--is absolutely fundamental to the process of intelligence. It would be like somebody doing research on geological strata out in the field and digging cores and not being willing to talk to the people back in the university who are analyzing it and writing the dissertation. What happens in this game is that the analyst needs some information. He walks across the hall and talks to the man who goes out and collects it. He describes it and the man says well, I've got this system and that system and I'll try a little of each and see what I get. He comes back and says here's what I have and the analyst oh no, you missed the point a little bit over here. I want to know the color of the nodes, not how thick they are. They go back and they try it again. Otherwise, we collect information about Country X and we analyze it on Country Y. It is utterly essential. I have in my time moved within the organization, somewhat in directions other than indicated. I am making a very clear division here, but I can't just separate them and even if I did, what difference would it make. I'd call one the CIA and the other one XIA or something like that and they'd still have to be there and work together. I think it's a subterfuge to simply tell you all that you are not working for the CIA because I call it the XIA.

- Q: There is a second issue which is the compatability between operations by intelligence agencies and analysis. It seems to me very different that I would ask Admiral Turner to put a contemporary version on that--whether he does not think it would be an incompatibility. Let's say the President of the United States was to simultaneously order him: one, to produce the best possible analysis of the Cuban role in Africa and two, conduct a worldwide propaganda campaign using CIA assets to exaggerate and to alarm people about the Cuban role in Africa; and whether an academic should not wonder about whether he should cooperate with CIA on the first question if they are simultaneously engaged in the second activity.
- A: Let me make sure we are understanding our terms here because that's a very good question. He called covert action the influencing of events in a foreign country. It is not really an intelligence function. Clandestine collection is collecting information secretly overseas about foreign activities. The third function we do is research. They're all lumped together because the country decided some years ago that when it was going to do covert action--attempt to influence events overseas, which is simply one step further in the diplomatic process but not going as far as sending in the marines--it decided that the Central Intelligence Agency would be the one to do that. There have been many studious proposals to separate all covert action activities out of the Central Intelligence Agency and put them elsewhere. When I first arrived I thought that might have some real merit and I looked at it quite carefully. It has some inferences that you want to be careful about. So we do a covert action overseas, like the propaganda situation Morton described, and we concentrate on getting the truth out to other people. We're not out to do a dirty tricks game, we're trying to penetrate and get people to understand what's happening in the world when their media or society is closed. Now, the same people who will do that for us are marvelous sources of intelligence. What would we do if we separate the two. We would construct two bureaucracies--many of them working with the same individuals overseas. It would number one be confusing and difficult, but think of the effect of having a second bureaucracy just for covert action. Ladies and gentlemen you know as well as I that bureaucracies tends to perpetuate themselves and tend to grow. Today if you're in covert action in the CIA, tomorrow it may be an entirely separate section. You don't have to push covert action in order to be sure you have a job tomorrow or that you'll be active and fully employed.

If you have an agency just to do covert action, I'm afraid it will be forced upon us and that it will be generated by that agency, whereas today that is not the case whatsoever. We in the Central Intelligence Agency look on this as a subsidiary function and we only respond to requests for assistance in the covert action field.

Q: Admiral Turner, could you possibly answer one of Morton Halperin's questions about the Church Committee Report and the possible declassification of the censored parts?

A: I'd be happy to. I have not seen nor have access to the portions of the Church Committee Report that were not published. That's a matter of the United States Senate and its committees. I can only assure you that the senators who reviewed what the CIA recommended be published was not published, are by no means tools of the CIA, they made up their minds what was in the national interest to publish, and what was not in the national interest to publish. And if anybody is going to reverse their decision it will be the senators, not the CIA.

Q: My name is Norman Birnbaum, and I was just embraced by Admiral Turner. I would, with respect, distance myself a little bit. As some of you may know, I'm in litigation with the CIA in a mail opening case. This happened under the administration when directorship of the CIA was not an Amherst but a Williams graduate, Richard Helms. The point is this: The nearness to the CIA, on which Admiral Turner spoke on my part, is represented by a consulting appointment to the National Security Council of the Executive Office of the President. It's quite true that in this function as consultant presumably the reports I do could be read by the CIA, they could also xerox my articles and send them around. But the fact is that this relationship is an open relationship which my students and colleagues know about and I must say that I am pleased to be helping the administration in foreign policy--it needs help. I must say that if I had been asked to be a consultant to the CIA, I would refuse. And I would refuse not out of any disinclination to do a public service but because of--and I'm candid at this point--the CIA's record in covert operations and manipulations. It's really very, very difficult if not impossible for anybody interested in contemporary politics or social affairs to approach another colleague and say, look I'm working for the CIA but I'm only asking for local information. It makes it very, very difficult and this is the reason I think that the question raised by the Church Committee and also by Mort Halperin about the separation of covert operations from intelligence, is a question which is in the national interest and would it seems to me be of interest.

- A: Let me start by reaffirming my written apology on behalf of my predecessor to Professor Birnbaum for his mail having been opened. There isn't one of us in the Agency today who doesn't believe that was a reprehensible mistake and we're very apologetic. At the same time, the professor's remark in attempting to distance himself from the CIA while he is working on the NSC, of which the CIA is a component part, strikes me as surprising. Although his relationship with the NSC is open, let me assure you he cannot work there without having access to secret information which he will not share with any of the rest of you or we will have to terminate his employment.
- Q: Admiral Turner, I'm addressing a concern to you in your capacity not simply as the Director of the CIA but as head of the Intelligence Community, a position you alluded to yourself. You spoke of research and research is very dear to our hearts. So is science and I think it has to be made clear that research is even steeper with science, but not quite the same thing. I'll try to make clear what I mean in a moment. That difference was very pointedly illustrated in several recent occurrences which involved attempts to preempt publication of the results of scientific research. One case I know of was supported by the National Science Foundation. Now the essence of science is not simply research, it is the availability of results to the scientific community and it seems to me that attempts to suppress this result, particularly when the Intelligence Community is not involved at all in financing or funding of these things, is to put it mildly insidious to the health of the scientific community and the academic community. And I don't understand how it could possibly be justified by anyone in the Intelligence Community.
- A: To begin with, I looked into this and I know of no authorized intelligence community effort to suppress those pieces of information. It was apparently somebody from the Intelligence Community acting as a member of the association or something who did try to discourage that. At the same time, I hope you are not stating that the man who worked so diligently during the 1940s under Stack Stadium at the University of Chicago should not have been allowed to keep their scientific research secretive. We're only allowed to have secrecy in times during war, is that correct? The distinction between peace and war is not that clear cut. And you certainly don't wait until the day the war starts to start building tanks. Our objective today is to ensure that we don't get into war and we have to have both scientific development and good intelligence information in order to achieve that objective which is what drives all of us in government and international relations.

- Q: I have been personally aware of Stan Turner's career for a good many years and I was pleased with his appointment and wish to assure him I would have voted for the President had I known his intention to assign Stan to his present duty. (inaudible)...Do you feel that we do in fact have a balance of national intelligence effort to make proper use of that.
- A: Thank you Dave. I do. As far as the reduction of clandestine intelligence operators is concerned, I would like to make it very clear that we did not reduce our clandestine people overseas where they are working on the important things. What we did was cut the overhead at headquarters. We were overstaffed and people were underemployed, and I don't see how I can challenge promising young people to make the future intelligence community unless we really challenge them and they were being so challenged because of the excess number of people. The second part of your question was are we working with the academic community, and the answer is no to that. That is what I am striving to improve and I think it is most important to both of us. About once every six weeks I get out on a college campus and speak and talk with students, both in small groups and also big public audiences. I'm trying to open up these channels of communication again because I think there is so much benefit to both sides.
- Q: Admiral Turner, for the sake of this question let's grant that proposition that it is essential from your perspective that the Intelligence Community and academia work together. It is a two part question: What is the professional identity status of the person who is recruited by the CIA as to the CIA's corps of professional and moral integrity? How is this relationship resolved where the contract with the person's university has a disclosure stipulation in other types of employment?
- A: That is a very interesting and good question. We believe with great sincerity that we are as moral and have as much integrity at the Central Intelligence Agency and Intelligence Community in general as any profession. The moral conflicts that are generated in intelligence work are neither quantitatively nor qualitatively different than the moral conflicts that are faced by most other professions and lines of work in our country. I come to this job as a former military officer. Look at the moral conflicts a military man faces when he asks the question--will he shoot to kill. There is no greater moral conflict that a man must face in life. Look at the moral conflicts that have been exposed in recent years about the American business community. Will you lose that contract or will you offer a bribe to that foreign company, or country with whom you are dealing. So

too, we in the intelligence have moral conflicts. But they are not different. They are tough and we work hard to get our people to understand basic ground rules under which they work, the standards which the President of the United States will accept, that I will accept, and it is not easy and it puts a tremendous load on the young people who come in and accept the sacrifices of being in the intelligence business. I assure you there are real sacrifices, but we do have a great sense of integrity and moral standards. I intend to insure that those are rigorously enunciated to all, the people who join our organization. And I would like you to know that at this moment I am very engrossed in a project with the leading academics and the leading universities in writing a specific code of ethics for the intelligence community. I found when I took this job that this man had written an article in a leading journal he said there was a code of ethics needed in the intelligence community. I called him up and asked him if he would work. That was a year and a quarter ago, we are still working on it. You can laugh, but it is not easy to do. It is not easy to write something that will be specific enough to give guidance and not so specific as to tie people's hands. Yet, I owe it to my people to give them moral and ethical guidance, because the man in the field has got to take that responsibility on his shoulders. They're young men and women out there who are doing it for you. They are brave, they are capable and they are moral. I am trying hard to give them explicit guidance to help them on their course. I thank you for the privilege of being with you today. I look forward to more interchange between all of us in the intelligence community of our country and all of you in the academic professions we all hold in such high esteem.

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